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This paper investigates silicosis as a disabling disease in underground 
mining in the United Kingdom (UK) before Second World War, exploring 
the important connections between South Africa and the UK and 
examining some of the issues raised at the 1930 International Labour 
Office Conference on silicosis in Johannesburg in a British context. The 
evidence suggests there were significant paradoxes and much 
contestation in medical knowledge creation, advocacy and policy-
making relating to this occupational disease. It is argued here that whilst 
there was an international exchange of scientific knowledge on silicosis 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, it was insufficient to 
challenge the traditional defence adopted by the British government of 
proven beyond all scientific doubt before effective intervention in coal 
mining. This circumspect approach reflected dominant business 
interests and despite relatively robust trade union campaigning and 
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eventual reform the outcome was an accumulative legacy of respiratory 
disease and disability that blighted coalfield communities.  
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Introduction: Britain and South Africa in silicosis politics 
Defining a disease as occupation-related, as Dembe [1996] has argued, 
is subject to a wide range of social, economic, political and cultural 
factors. Historians Rosner and Markowitz [1994] and Bufton and Melling 
[2005a] have shown how the politics of silicosis was complex, with a 
plethora of individuals and groups participating in the campaigns to 
attain recognition of it as an occupational disease and enforce 
preventative measures, regulation and extend compensation schemes. 
In mining, recent research [Lyddon, 2014; McIvor and Johnston 2007; 
Bloor, 2000] has emphasLVHGWKHSLYRWDOUROHSOD\HGE\WKHPLQHUV¶
trade unions and the way they effectively marshalled their own 
DOWHUQDWLYHµOD\¶HSLGHPLRORJ\DQGFKDOOHQJHGPHGLFDORUWKRGR[LHV. 
Within these debates and campaigns H[DPSOHVRIµEHVWSUDFWLFH¶
elsewhere outside the United Kingdom (UK) played a part, not least in 
enabling the case to be made that unhealthy work processes had been 
identified through extensive and rigorous epidemiology, and that 
diseases like silicosis were capable of being tackled by rigorous state 
intervention without significantly undermining the competitiveness of an 
industry. This was the case with South Africa and the regulation of 
silicosis from the 1910s, which was held up as an exemplar in North 
America [Derickson, 1988, p. 86] and Britain. Hence, one British 
delegate to the International Labour Office Conference on silicosis in 
Johannesburg in 1930 (pulmonary disease specialist Professor Arthur 
Hall) GHVFULEHG6RXWK$IULFDDVµWKHPHFFDIRUVLOLFRVLVUHVHDUFKHUV¶LQ 
The Lancet [Hall, 1930]. Similarly silicosis pathologist Professor E.H. 
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Kettle commented after the conference in the British Medical Journal: 
µWKHH[SHULHQFHRI6RXWK$IULFDQZRUNHUV[meaning medical 
researchers] was so great that considerable weight must be given to 
WKHLUYLHZV¶ [Kettle, 1930, p. 780]. Four years after the conference Chief 
Medical Inspector of Factories Sydney W. Fisher referred to the seminal 
contribution of research in South Africa and in the ensuing discussion a 
commentator (William Cullen) referred to the pioneering of radiography 
RQWKH5DQGµZKHUHFROOHFWLYHO\WKHUHKDVEHHQPRUHGRQHWKDQDWDQ\
RWKHUFHQWUHLQWKHZRUOG¶ [Fisher, 1934-5, p. 23]. British pathologists like 
Stevenson Lyle Cummins at the Cardiff Medical School in South Wales 
explicitly compared the x-rays of South African silicotics with those of 
Welsh coal miners to demonstrate the similarities, whilst the British 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VKHDOWKWKLQNWDQNWKH0HGLFDO5HVHDUFK&ouncil [1942, p. 
151], also referred to the key role of South Africa in developing 
knowledge of silicosis.  
Trade unionists and sympathetic Labour Party politicians also used the 
South African example in an attempt to cajole and shame the British 
government into action to extend the restrictive silicosis compensation 
scheme (introduced in 1918) to make it more inclusive, notably in 
relation to coal miners. Frequent references were made, for example, to 
the pioneering use of dust suppression methods in South Africa by 
mining trade union officials [Davies, undated, p. 6]. Playing the South 
African card is clearly evident in a dialogue in the House of Commons in 
February 1934 between the Labour Party disability rights activist David 
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Rhys Grenfell (representing Gower, South Wales) and the Liberal Party 
Secretary for Mines, Ernest Brown: 
Grenfell:  Whether, in view of the prevalence of miners' phthisis 
in the coal-mining industry, he will consider the compulsory 
adoption of wet drilling-machines for boring in all operations for 
blasting and removal of stone in coal mines. 
Brown: The application of a general measure of the kind 
SURSRVHGWRGULOOLQJLQDOONLQGVRIVWRQHZRXOGQRWDSSHDU«WR
be an appropriate remedial measure. 
Grenfell: In view of the enormous number of disablement cases 
reported at the present time, does not the honorable gentleman 
believe that it is the duty of his Department to provide means by 
which these cases can be avoided? 
Brown: The answer is that my first duty is to ascertain the 
IDFWV«WKHKRQRXUDEOHPember will see that it is not possible to 
take the line that he suggests. 
Grenfell: Is it not the duty of the Department to follow in this 
case the example of South Africa, where death and 
disablement from miners' phthisis have been wiped out? 
Brown: It would be unwise to draw a comparison without full 
knowledge in both cases.  
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Grenfell: Is not the knowledge fully within the possession of the 
Department now? The knowledge is available to us, and the 
Department should have it.  
Brown: There is a vast amount of knowledge, but it leads to 
varying conclusions on the part of men who are experts from 
various points of view.  
Grenfell: Is it not the case that in South Africa miners' lives 
have been saved, while in this country lives are being lost in 
large numbers? 
Brown: I could not admit that [Hansard, 1934]. 
This conversation is revealing at a number of levels. What might be 
highlighted is the way that the government in power denied the extent of 
the problem, cast doubt on scientific or technical solutions and could 
allude to a lack of consensus and of contested medical evidence and 
opinion as a riposte to the (albeit exaggerated) claims that another 
nation (i.e. South Africa) had conquered the scourge of silicosis. Similar 
references to South Africa as the exemplar of µEHVWSUDFWLFH¶on silicosis 
continued to crop up to the 1950s [Minister of Pensions and National 
Insurance, 1955, p. 105; Trades Union Congress, 1958, p. 244] . How 
did this relationship evolve in the earlier twentieth century and how did 
the 1930 Johannesburg Conference contribute to understanding and 
policy-making in the UK? 
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Forging international links and deepening awareness 
The links between South Africa and Britain in relation to workplace 
health and safety in mining were evident long before the 1930 
Johannesburg conference, as was the existence of a serious respiratory 
disability problem in British mines. In the early twentieth century, 
however, this was almost universally considered to be an issue 
affecting metal miners and not the far more numerous coal miners 
[Bufton and Melling, 2005a; Mills, 2010; Morrison, 2010]. John S. 
+DOGDQH¶VSLRQHHULQJUHVHDUch in 1900-02 identified high levels of 
silicosis amongst the Cornish tin miners in South West England. These 
miners frequently migrated to work LQ6RXWK$IULFD¶VJROGPLQHV and 
remigrated back home when disabled to be cared for by family, or, in 
the last resort ended up in the workhouse [Derickson, 1988, pp. 77-78]. 
+DOGDQH¶VZRUNimplicated dusty conditions abroad in South Africa as 
well as in Cornwall where miners worked with machine drills with little or 
no SURWHFWLRQ2IµOLIHWLPH¶PDFKLQHGULOOPLQHUVZKRGLHGLQRQH
area in Cornwall (Redruth), 133 died of respiratory diseases, with the 
average age of death just 37 years. Non-machine miners lived on 
average 16 years longer to 53 years [Shufflebotham, 1914; Louis, 1902; 
Haldane, et al., 1904]. 
This was not the only deleterious FRQQHFWLRQZLWKWKHµXQK\JLHQLF¶DQG
unhealthy mines in South Africa. Cornish tin miners also brought back 
intestinal worms which led to serious outbreaks of anklyostomiasis 
before First World War. This fuelled anxieties about in-migration of 
germs in ZRUNHUV¶ERGLHVWKDWODWHUH[WHQGHGWRVHULRXV concerns about 
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the spread of tuberculosis (TB) in British mines by migrant workers, for 
example from Poland (to Scotland) and Eastern Europe [Oliver, 1925, 
p. 530; Burke, 1985]. Around the same time another South African 
disease transmission story emerged in the North of England. Thomas 
Oliver (perhaps the most famous of British occupational health 
researchers of this era) reported that large numbers of British miners 
returned to North East England from the Transvaal as a consequence 
of the protracted  Boer War (1899-1902). Many had severe silicosis 
which Oliver put down to inhaling rock dust in South African mines 
[Shufflebotham, 1914, 589]. The South African government were aware 
RI+DOGDQHDQG2OLYHU¶Vfindings and that (together, as Rosental [2015] 
KDVDUJXHGZLWKJURZLQJµSROLWLFDODQGPHGLDSUHVVXUH¶IURPWKH8.
triggered the first Transvaal silicosis enquiry and, from there, the first 
worldwide official recognition of silicosis for compensation in South 
Africa in 1912. 7KLVILUVWVWXG\RIWKHZKLWHµ(XURSHDQ¶ gold miners in 
South Africa found 31.6% of underground miners examined to have 
µPLQHUV¶SKWKLVLV¶DQGalmost half (47.5%) of all machine drillers had the 
disease. It was estimated that 90% of the underground workforce would 
µHYHQWXDOO\¶FRQWUDFWWKHGLVHDVHDQGWKDW7%UDWHVDPRQJVWWKRVHZLWK
silicosis were three times higher than those who were healthy 
[Shufflebotham, 1914, p. 589]. 
Inhaling dust at work left an enormous legacy of disability and 
premature mortality in mining communities. Dust featured prominently in 
the UK government enquiry into occupational disease in 1906-7 that led 
WRVL[GLVHDVHVEHLQJDGGHGWRWKH:RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ$FW 
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(which to date had only covered industrial injuries). One of the key 
factors that led to silicosis (or any pneumoconiosis) not being included 
at this point as an  industrial disease XQGHUWKH:RUNPHQ¶V
Compensation Act was medical disagreements over whether and to 
what extent this was a different and distinct disease from tuberculosis. It 
was also widely believed that improvements in ventilation in coal mines 
from mid-nineteenth century had eliminated fibrosis of the lung. The 
coal owners marshalled medical evidence from their company 
physicians to support this optimistic prognosis and some prominent 
occupational health specialists such as Thomas Oliver endorsed it. 
Business interests were mobilised in a policy of containment. In metal 
mining, nonetheless, the key role of research on silicosis being carried 
out in South Africa was acknowledged in Britain in the Royal 
Commission on Metalliferous Mines and Quarries in 1913-14 [1914, pp. 
138-139], not least by Edgar Collis. There was also awareness of 
important research deriving from Australia and New Zealand [Morrison, 
pp.134-135]. 
So, the flow of migrant labour back and forth from the UK to South 
Africa stimulated research into silicosis in the early twentieth century. 
This reciprocal knowledge exchange led to some limited regulation, 
including the pioneering South Africa legislation of 1912 which 
recognised silicosis amongst metal miners for compensation. The need 
to suppress dust also found its way in to the UK Mines Act of 1911, 
though this was a vague recommendation and not enforced. It was the 
First World War that was critical in shifting the balance of power in the 
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UK necessary to provide a conducive environment for the recognition of 
silicosis as an industrial disease. Silicosis was first added as a 
prescribed disease to the UK :RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQ$FW in 1918. 
Whilst an important watershed, this legislation was extremely limited in 
reality, with coverage only of certain factory-based trades such as tool 
grinders and pottery workers. Miners were excluded. 
In the 1920s, as Bufton and Melling [2005b] have shown, growing 
concerns about the silicosis risk amongst miners was fuelled by new 
PHGLFDOHYLGHQFHDQGDFDPSDLJQE\ZRUNHUV¶DGYRFDWHVled by the 
South Wales MinerV¶)HGHUDWLRQ  In the anthracite coal mines of South 
Wales rates of respiratory disease were particularly high. In 1925 Hans 
Pirow (then an Inspector of Mines in South Africa) was appointed by the 
UK Health Advisory Committee of the Mines Department to investigate 
work conditions of rock drillers in coal mining districts in the UK [Mines 
Department, 1926,  pp.38-39]. After returning to South Africa, Pirow 
was an influential South African delegate to the 1930 Johannesburg 
conference. This demonstrates the regard that South African expertise 
in this area was held at the time and growing concerns about the 
silicosis risk amongst the coal miners [Fisher, 1935]. Indeed the 
accumulating evidence around a cluster of health issues, including the 
PLQHUV¶H\HGLVHDVHQ\VWDJPXVµEHDW¶KDQGNQHHDQGHOERZ
conditions and respiratory disease, led to the appointment by the British 
state of the first Medical Inspector of Mines (Sydney W. Fisher in 1927). 
7KLVDSSRLQWPHQWZDVRQWKHDGYLFHRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V+HDOWK
Advisory &RPPLWWHHLQUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWµ90 per cent of the claims paid 
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for occupational diseases are paid to men employed in mines and 
TXDUULHV¶ [Ministry of Power, 1927]. Significantly, in the discussions 
around this appointment in the archived Ministry of Power papers the 
cost to the industry of this loss (or µLQHIILFLHQF\¶) was part of the 
GLVFRXUVHDVZHOODVµVXIIHULQJ¶7KHUHZHUHFDOOVIRUµPHGLFDO
examination of all persons who seek employment in mines and the 
HUDGLFDWLRQRIDOOXQILWSHUVRQVZKRKDYHHQWHUHGWKHP¶ [Ministry of 
Power, 1927]. After substantial trade union lobbying and further 
accumulation of medical evidence :RUNPHQ¶V&RPSHQVDWLRQOHJLVODWLRQ
relating to silicosis in Britain was amended in 1928 to include some 
provision for miners ± though in its ILUVWLWHUDWLRQLQWKH:RUNPHQ¶V
Compensation Various Industries Scheme this was extremely restrictive 
(limited to miners drilling in stone and in rock with at least 50% silica 
content). Compensation was only given on death or permanent 
respiratory disability deemed as sufficient to prevent ever working 
again. This re-focus on the silicosis risk in mining in the later 1920s 
mirrored a wider preoccupation with the threat of workplace dust 
inhalation in the UK. The Merewether and Price enquiry on asbestosis 
was published several months before the Johannesburg Silicosis 
Conference and led directly to the first UK Government Regulations on 
Asbestos (in 1931).   
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Medical orthodoxies and the containment of risk at the 1930 
Johannesburg Conference on silicosis 
The British contribution to the 1930 Johannesburg Conference  was 
significant, with the largest number of delegates (four) of the non-host 
countries. These were the afore-mentioned Dr Sydney W. Fisher, 
Medical Inspector of Mines, Dr Edward L. Middleton, Medical Inspector 
of Factories, Prof. Arthur J. Hall, University Professor and Chair of the 
MHGLFDO5HVHDUFK&RXQFLO¶V Industrial Pulmonary Diseases¶ Committee 
and Prof. E.H. Kettle, a pathologist and silicosis specialist (responsible 
for important work testing the impact of dust inhalation on animals in 
laboratory experiments) based at the Medical School, University of 
London. As Rosental has noted in his contribution to this collection, the 
1930 conference organisers requested Edgar Collis (1870-1957), but 
this recommendation was rejected by the British government in favour 
of its own civil servants and government committee members [Rosental, 
2015]. Collis was amongst the best known of UK medical specialists on 
silicosis at the time, and was amongst those who were sceptical about 
the prevailing idea (supported by John S. Haldane) that coal dust was 
innocuous LQPLQHUV¶UHVSLUDWRU\GLVHDVH [Collis, 1919; Collis and 
Gilchrist, 1928]. Collis also had radical ideas about ZKDWKHFDOOHGµWKH
UHFODPDWLRQRIWKHGLVDEOHG¶ [Collis and Greenwood, 1921]. His absence 
was significant.  
TKHµFRUH¶knowledge being discussed at the 1930 Johannesburg 
Conference was that of the 20 years or so of experience in the South 
African gold mines with silicosis and the epidemiology, regulatory and 
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compensation responses. However, the considerable knowledge of 
silicosis research in the UK (and elsewhere) was also fed into the 
discussions and had an impact on the outcomes. The contributions of 
the British delegates are revealing as they exhibited a conservative and 
bureaucratic approach, reflecting the preYDLOLQJµVFLHQWLVP¶RIWKHGD\
The notion that dominated was that something had to be proven, 
verified and irrefutably corroborated with epidemiological evidence 
before any remedial action could be taken. Probabilities based on 
actual lay evidence and experience within mining communities stood for 
little. The 1930 conference thus probably did little to affect the practical 
politics of the struggle to get silicosis properly recognised as an issue in 
mining in the UK in the 1930s. However, it does tell us a lot about 
prevailing discourses, beliefs and contested medical knowledge, whilst 
the exchange of information at the scientific and epidemiological level 
and the publicity the conference generated undoubtedly had some 
effect in raising the profile of the disease in the UK.  
Amongst the points British delegate Edward L. Middleton made in his 
opening remarks to the conference was that serious disability and death 
could come after very short exposures to dust inhalation at work. One 
example he gave was of a silicotic with only two and half years¶ work 
experience in a dusty trade [ILO, 1930, pp. 26-27]. He declared he was 
not able to definitively determine a standard of air dustiness that was 
dangerous and welcomed discussion on this (significantly there was no 
recommended standard of airborne dustiness adopted at the 
conference). On two points he appears to have embraced prevailing 
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medical orthodoxies: Firstly, that other dusts (e.g., coal/carbon) acted 
DVµUHVWUDLQLQJDJHQWV¶RUµDQWLGRWHV¶WRVLOLFRVLV and tuberculosis 
(following J.S. Haldane) and, secondly, that tuberculosis was the critical 
issue, postulatLQJWKDWµVLOLFRVLVZDVQRWGHYHORSHGLQDKHDOWK\OXQJ¶
The idea that inhaling coal dust had any prophylactic effect was 
immediately rejected by Dr Bohme, based on research amongst miners 
in Germany [ILO, 1930, pp. 38-39].  The final conference resolution on 
this firmly rejected +DOGDQH¶VWKHRU\RIcoal GXVWDVDQµDQWLGRWH¶to 
tuberculosis, whilst calling for further investigative research [ILO, 1930, 
p. 95]. The conference defined silicosis clearly as a distinct 
occupational disease (and not as a type of TB) with discrete stages and 
a synergistic relationship to TB. As Rosental [2015] has noted, this was 
a major step forward and a key contribution of the 1930 Johannesburg 
conference. 
0LGGOHWRQ¶VVXEPLWWHGwritten report on Britain also underlines his 
conservatism. This was extensive at 96 pages [ILO, 1930, pp. 384-480] 
but of this, only eight pages dealt with mining. Middleton embraced the 
existing orthodoxy in emphasising that silicosis was prevalent in certain 
factories and in metal mining, but that where a respiratory health risk 
existed in coal mining it was only in specific operations involving 
working with silica-rich rock as distinct from an exposure risk across the 
entire underground mining labour force. 0LGGOHWRQ¶VSDSHULGHQWLILHGWKH
risks inherent in dry rock drilling and narrowly defined those exposed to 
risk LQWKHµSURFHVVHV¶RIULSSLQJEODVWLQJRIURRIGULYLQJWKURXJKURFN
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and drifts [ILO, 1930, p. 427]. This conservative strategy of containment 
was evident when he commented:  
Certain workers employed below ground in coal mines contract 
DGLVDEOLQJDQGHYHQIDWDOILEURVLVRIWKHOXQJV«7KHVHFDVHV
although at first sight they seem so varied, when reduced to 
main factors show that all the men worked for a certain time in 
rock [ILO, 1930, p. 429]. 
He continued with a cautionary note: µ,WLVLPSRVVLEOHDV\HWWRDUULYHDW
WKHWUXHLQFLGHQFHRIVLOLFRVLVLQWKHFRDOILHOGV¶ 
The statistical data Middleton presented to the 1930 conference 
revealingly indicated the limited extent of preventative measures in 
operation (water and dust traps) which were supposed to be 
compulsory under the Mines Act of 1911 where mechanical drills were 
being used. What stands out is the blatant flouting of this legislation as 
in 60% of the mines surveyed no dust control measures were in place 
[ILO, 1930, p. 428]. This chimes with McIvor and Johnston¶V argument 
in 0LQHUV¶/XQJ that statutory regulations and mines inspection systems 
were systematically disregarded ± and much oral (and other) evidence  
supports this flouting of the law [McIvor and Johnston, 2007, pp. 246-
259].This was partly a product of managerial power and authority to 
impose the will of employers ± facilitated in the interwar Depression 
when mass unemployment prevailed in mining communities. This was 
also the consequence of a prevailing productionist workplace culture 
where high levels of risk were tolerated, through socialisation, policed 
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by peer preVVXUHWRDFWDVµUHDOPHQ¶LQDFXOWXUHZKHUHµ6WDNhDQRYLWHV¶
RUµELJHDUQHUV¶ZHUHH[DOWHG within mining communities. What is 
conspicuously absent from the discussions at the 1930 Johannesburg 
conference is any comment on power and workplace cultures; on 
ZRUNHUV¶DJHQF\DQGWKHFRQVWUDLQWVXSRQFKRLFHOLQNHGWRWKHFRQWURO
exerted by mine owners and expressed through mine management. 
Irvine, 0DYURJRUGDWRDQG3LURZ¶VFRPPHQWVWKDWFRPSDQLHVFRXOGILQG
the costs of preventative measures prohibitive was about as far as any 
critique of company irresponsibility and misuse of power went [ILO, 
1930, pp. 178-208]. The contributions RI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQJHQWWRWKH1930 
Johannesburg conference invariably define the dust risk narrowly, 
rather than inviting debate on the breadth and depth of risk ± for 
example within the coalfields. They also did not dissent from what 
Rosental [2015] KDVWHUPHGWKHµWUXQFDWLQJ¶GHILQLWLRQRIVLOLFRVLVZKLFK
excluded the early stages of the disease from compensation (following 
the established pattern in South Africa). They also failed, as McCulloch 
has noted, to challenge medical orthodoxies and swallowed hook, line 
and sinker the South African public relations rhetoric of healthy and well 
regulated gold mines after two decades of state intervention 
[McCulloch, 2012, p. 77]. This was designed explicitly to ease their 
labour recruitment problems. The discussions were all about the 
experience of the minority of white miners in South Africa. Neither the 
lack of data on the more numerous black workforce (c200,000), nor the 
discourse that black workers were not affected because of the transient 
nature of their employment with high labour turnover, were effectively 
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challenged. Hall raised a question about this at the 1930 conference 
and Orenstein (Superintendent of Sanitation for the Rand Mines Ltd) 
UHVSRQGHGWKDWµWKHLQFLGHQFHRIVLOLFRVLV«RQQDWLYHVZDVUHODWLYHO\
ORZ¶DQGµLWFRXOGEHDVVXPHGWKDWLQWHUPLWWHQWHPSOR\PHQWJDve 
FRQVLGHUDEOHSURWHFWLRQ¶ [ILO, 1930, p.78]. A Medical Officer of the 
5DQG0XWXDO,QVXUDQFH&RPSDQ\'U$QGUHZ:DWWDGGHGWKDWµWKH
natives do not breathe through their mouths and, therefore, were 
SURWHFWHGE\DEHWWHUILOWHUWKDQ(XURSHDQV¶ [ILO, 1930, p. 78]. 
Contradicting this, the expert on the aetiology of silicosis in African 
mines (Mavrogordato) had made the point earlier in the conference that 
µQDWLYHVZKRZHUHHPSOR\HGFRQWLQXRXVO\GHYHORSHGVLOLFRVLVPRUH
UDSLGO\WKDQ(XURSHDQV¶ [ILO, 1930, p. 45]. As Ehrlich has shown, 
racialization in ZRUNPHQ¶Vcompensation law in South African mining 
persisted until almost the end of the twentieth century [Ehrlich, 2012]. 
After 1930, silicosis certifications rocketed massively in the UK amongst 
coal mining workers, notably in South Wales [Bufton and Melling, 
2005a; 2005b]. Within a few years, moreover, it was recognised that 
apart from classic silicosis, coal miners were also suffering from a 
fibrosis of the lungs connected solely to inhaling coal dust. In an echo of 
the 1930 Johannesburg conference, all four British delegates ± Fisher, 
Middleton, Hall and Kettle ± were on the Industrial Pulmonary Disease 
Committee (IPDC) of the UK Medical Research Council from 1936 that 
LQYHVWLJDWHGµGLVHDVH[¶± DµQHZ¶SQHXPRFRQLRVLVRUUDWKHUa re-
GLVFRYHUHGYHUVLRQRIDQWKUDFRVLVRUµEODFNOXQJ¶Similar delays to 
DFFXPXODWHLUUHIXWDEOHµVFLHQWLILF¶ evidence followed and the outbreak of 
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Second World War intervened. CRDOZRUNHUV¶SQHXPRFRQLRVLV (CWP) 
was officially recognised and scheduled under WKH:RUNPHQ¶V
Compensation Act in the UK in 1942. This was the outcome of a 
combination of factors, including sustained campaigning by the mining 
WUDGHXQLRQVLQYROYLQJWKHDFFUXLQJRIDQDOWHUQDWLYHERG\RIµOD\¶
epidemiological knowledge [McIvor and Johnston, 2007, pp. 185-236; 
Bloor, 2000]. 
µ2XWFDVWV¶$GGUHVVing the problem of disabled silicotics 
In the 1930 Johannesburg Conference the voices of organised labour 
as advocates for diseased workers are marked by their absence, 
despite the fact that the International Labour Office and the International 
6WRQHZRUNHUV¶)HGHUDWLRQ were instrumental in setting the 1930 
conference up. This was in marked contrast to the British CWP 
LQYHVWLJDWLRQIURPZKHQIURPWKHRXWVHWWKHYLHZVRIWKHPLQHUV¶
trade unions (as well as community doctors and physicians) were 
sought and fed in to the process of accumulating knowledge and 
evidence-gathering [Medical Research Council, 1936]. 
As in South Africa, tRDGGUHVVZKDWZDVSHUFHLYHGDVWKHµSUREOHP¶RI
the silicotics, those certified with the disease by medical panels set up 
from 1919 in the UK were dismissed from their employment. This 
sacking policy appears to have divided the 1930 Johannesburg 
conference. On the one hand were those that supported sackings on 
the grounds that this removed silicotics from dusty atmospheres that 
would worsen their health further. To leave them in the job sucking in 
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the dust would equate, one delegate (Du Toit) DUJXHGWRµVORZVXLFLGH¶ 
[ILO, 1930, p. 82]. Others saw dismissal as justified on the grounds that 
the TB cross-infection risk had to be minimised. On the other hand were 
arguments that in the interwar Depression there were few alternative 
job opportunities for miners, especially older men, so unemployment 
and the deleterious physical and mental impacts of loss of work and 
income worsened their situation. Work could be bad for you, but 
unemployment was undeniably worse for health and well-being before 
the era of the Welfare State. Fisher made this point in relation to British 
coalfields, where unemployment levels were unprecedentedly high 
during the Depression [ILO, 1930, p. 83]. The 1930 conference decided 
on a compromise recommendation on this which supported dismissal 
where any TB was detected and with just silicosis (without TB) a policy 
where sackings of younger, less experienced workers was encouraged, 
with some flexibility to retain older workers ± over 45 ± in employment 
[ILO, 1930, p. 101]. The opportunity to declare an obligation upon 
industry based on social responsibility to provide alternative 
employment in dust-free occupations or full pensions was passed by, 
despite an Australian delegate (W.E. George) to the 1930 conference 
commenting that this was the prevailing policy in the mining community 
in Broken Hill where he was a medical officer [ILO, 1930, p. 83].  
The increased medical surveillance upon workers which went along 
with the emerging silicosis compensation schemes in South Africa, 
Britain and elsewhere meant that workers¶ bodies were now under 
unprecedented levels of scrutiny. The importance of pre-emptive 
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medical selection of the fittest workers was validated at the 1930 
conference which adopted the resolution: 
The physique of the worker is a factor of primary importance. 
An initial medical examination to ensure a certain standard of 
physique should be generally adopted in those industries in 
which the risk of exposure to silica dust is great. Periodic 
medical examination of such workers is also essential [ILO, 
1930, p. 101]. 
This was both intrusive and facilitated mine owners¶ efforts to maximise 
their output by cherry-picking the strongest workers and those least 
liable to be a compensation burden. Cost-cutting, profit-oriented 
efficiency lay behind this identification through medical examinations of 
the fittest and the weeding out of physically weaker workers as well as 
the disabled silicotics. The 1930 conference also picked up on the fact 
that there was much uncertainty and contestation over the impact that 
further dust exposure in employment could have on the progression of 
the disease [ILO, 1930, pp. 100-101]. There was also recognition at the 
conference that re-employment and rehabilitation schemes were 
uneven across industry and had been largely µXQVXFFHVVIXO¶. 
In Britain, the policies endorsed in the 1930 Johannesburg Conference 
did little if anything to improve the predicament of disabled workers and 
particularly those with respiratory disease, including silicotics, 
pneumoconiotics and the tuberculous, who were routinely sacked from 
their jobs throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Stigma and prejudice faced 
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WKHVHµOXQJHUV¶DVZHOODVGLUHHFRnomic deprivation. As a consequence 
there was a real fear of medical examinations and a tendency to hide 
and work on through encroaching respiratory disability. As a Swansea 
doctor (H.R. Stubbins) who wrote his thesis on silicosis reported in 
µ0RVWRIWKHPHQDUHUHOXFWDQWWREHH[DPLQHGEHFDXVHLIWKH
Medical Board turns them down they lose their jobs and the amount of 
FRPSHQVDWLRQLVORZ¶ [Medical Research Council, 1936, p. 191]. Where 
job opportunities existed and mine owners were of the welfarist 
persuasion (as for example with the Fife Coal Company in Scotland) 
alternative job opportunities could sometimes be found. Shifting such 
disabled men to µOLJKWZRUN¶DQGWRwork on the surface (screening, 
grading and washing coal) was not uncommon. Such work commanded 
significantly lower wages, however, and was regarded by hewers as 
demeaning and a slight on their masculinity. Other silicotic miners found 
work in labouring jobs outside of the industry, generally poorly paid. 
What characterised this experience was a transition invariably from 
skilled to unskilled and more insecure, worse paid and less intrinsically 
rewarding work [Fletcher, 1948, pp. 1066-1067]. There is no evidence, 
however, that delegates to the 1930 Johannesburg conference 
recognised these emasculating mutations in identities. Moreover, in the 
1930s Depression alternative work became much scarcer and the plight 
of the disabled worsened. The first Pneumoconiosis Research Unit 
(PRU) studies in the mid-late 1940s were devoted to sociological 
investigations of the lived experience of such disabled miners, 
described by PRU DirectoU&KDUOHV)OHWFKHUDVµRXWFDVWV¶. Numbering 
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more than 20,000 by 1945 in South Wales alone, the position of this 
disabled community across the South Wales mining villages was 
desperate. The PRU studies were influential in getting the dismissal 
policy reversed and silicotics and pneumoconiotics largely reabsorbed 
into the mining workforce by the early 1950s [Fletcher, 1948; National 
Joint Pneumoconiosis Committee, 1950]. State ownership of the 
industry from 1947 and improved rights for disabled people (enshrined 
in the Disabled Persons Act, 1944) facilitated this.  
CONCLUSION 
What is evident from this story around the interplay of research, 
advocacy and policy on silicosis between South Africa and Britain is 
that there was a significant exchange of knowledge across national 
boundaries on silicosis from the 1900s through to the 1930s (and 
beyond).This contributed to the recognition of silicosis as an industrial 
disease and the compensation systems and practices that ensued. 
Ultimately, however, the attempt to use the South African experience 
as a lever to cajole LQWHUZDU%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶Vinto action was 
unsuccessful, failing to penetrate the traditional defences of the state 
to wait until scientific evidence had accrued to prove the case beyond 
all doubt. The mine owners benefitted from this commitment to the 
status quo, from DQRXWGDWHGµVFLHQWLVP¶DQGIURPGLVDJUHHPHQWV
within medicine (that the mine owners fostered) about the etiology of 
work-induced respiratory disease amongst miners. For all its 
achievements in defining silicosis, the 1930 Johannesburg Conference 
on silicosis legitimised the status quo rather than fundamentally 
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challenging it. Moreover, by failing to tackle rehabilitation or support 
the idea of corporate responsibility for those disabled in the course of 
their employment the ongoing desperate plight of the dismissed 
disabled silicotics was ignored and perhaps even exacerbated. This 
cautionary and conservative approach was to characterise silicosis 
and other occupational diseases (including asbestos) through the 
1930s and beyond. :RUNPHQ¶V&ompensation schemes remained 
restrictive, excluding vast swathes of disabled mine workers in the 
1920s and 1930s, including most coal miners, whilst an opportunity to 
identify and condemn the generic problem of dust generation in 
employment was spurned. A legacy of this was the accumulation of 
crippling and deadly respiratory diseases which contributed to making 
coalfields in the UK (and elsewhere) the most unhealthy and disability 
prone of all working class communities in the twentieth century.  
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